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Abstract
The rule of law in the European Union rests on a precarious decentralised judicial 
architecture with the two pillars of the judicatures of the EU and of the Member 
States. Judicial protection emerges as the meta-norm for the governance of this com-
plex governance scheme. It re-orientates the entire EU judicial architecture towards 
protecting individual rights grounded in EU law. The article makes three support-
ing arguments: First, the norm of judicial protection has become institutionalised in 
law, through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Treaty on European Union and 
relating jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court). 
Further, as judicial protection becomes a meta-norm, capable of overriding even 
conflicting primary EU law that would preserve the discretion of the political EU 
institutions or the procedural autonomy of the Member States. Finally, by reference 
to the norm of judicial protection, the Court’s doctrine has been shaping a single 
code of procedure that welds the entire twin-pillared EU judicial architecture into a 
coherent whole. The article documents this single code of procedure for a horizontal 
dimension of the Court of Justice of the EU and a vertical dimension of the Mem-
ber States courts. The implications of this rise of judicial protection to meta-norm 
applies to a wide variety of debates on the judicial architecture, ranging from a EU 
federal question jurisdiction of Member States courts, enforcement of the independ-
ence of the judiciary in the sovereign Member States, to the integration of interna-
tional and third-country courts. The article concludes that the ultimate legitimacy of 
European integration depends on rights being taken seriously through their guaran-
teed judicial protection.
 * Volker Roeben 
 vroeben@dundee.ac.uk
1 Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee, Dundee, 
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1 Introduction
The Rule of Law in the European Union hinges on its judicial architecture. The Lis-
bon Treaty1 has left unchanged the design, by the Founding Treaties, of a decentral-
ised judicial architecture for the European Union that rests on two pillars, the judi-
cature of the European Union and the judicatures of the Member States.2 Both are 
organizationally independent. This article argues that since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, that architecture has become much more centralised. Driving this 
transformation is the judicial protection that individuals ought to receive for their 
rights under EU law.3 In this role judicial protection replaces alternatives such as the 
effectiveness or authority of EU law or indeed the rule of law as such.4
To see and assess this transformational change, this article adopts an analytic, 
rather than a normative or legally-reconstructive approach. To that effect, the article 
re-conceptualises judicial protection as the new meta-norm for the EU judicial archi-
tecture. Understanding judicial protection as meta-norm gives a clearer perspective 
on driver and consequences of the changing law.
The concept of (meta)-norm originates in the explicative study of collec-
tive action in diverse contexts, in particular the social rules for actors in complex 
governance schemes.5 A meta-norm embodies the principal value judgments that 
actors may refer to when making hard choices in developing the scheme, and which 
explain these choices. The judicial architecture of the European Union can be seen 
as a complex scheme. Governing this two-pillared structure means making choices 
on trade-offs between competing values and interests, between decentralization and 
centralization, between strict judicial control and political flexibility, and between 
authority of law and effective contestation. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (the Court)6 is the principal actor tasked with governing this scheme. Judicial 
protection has become the single meta-norm that provides the Court with orienta-
tion in governing this architecture. It directs for the architecture to be designed so 
that individuals receive the same effective protection to enforce their EU law-rights 
whenever these are contested, be it by the EU or the Member States, and by courts 
that operate under a single organizational and procedural standard, and that this pro-
tection is prioritised over competing values and interests.
1 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007 OJ C 306/1.
2 Wells (2017) (decentralised judicial federalism for not setting up first instance EU courts with original 
jurisdiction over questions of EU law and noting the contrast with the centralised judicial federalism of 
the USA).
3 The Court speaks of ‘judicial system’, see Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV, Case C-284/16, 6 
March 2018, ¶ 35.
4 Dougan, (2011) (effectiveness the dominant narrative).
5 Kooiman and Jentoft (2009).
6 Hereinafter, Court of the Justice of the EU comprises the European Court of Justice, the General 
Court, and specialised courts. References solely to the Court refer to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).
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This conceptualization of judicial protection as the master-norm for the EU judi-
cial architecture then leads to three claims that the article will make on the changing 
EU judicial architecture. First, judicial protection is progressively institutionalised 
through the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the amended Treaty on European 
Union, and the relating jurisprudence of the Court. Further, judicial protection 
drives the development of a single code of procedure for both pillars of the EU’s 
judicial architecture, which the Court has been establishing through its dynamic 
jurisprudence. Third, judicial protection takes priority and overrides conflicting 
principles such as the EU institutions’ discretion or the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, morphing into constitutional core of the EU legal order.
The article hence demonstrates, first, that judicial protection has become an insti-
tution of EU law under the Treaty of Lisbon. The term is used here in the sense of 
a legal institution that turns an idea into law, through legislative and judicial deci-
sions.7 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) now 
enshrines a fundamental right to judicial protection at the level of EU primary law. 
The animating idea of this fundamental right is to enforce individual rights and only 
rights. Right is a thick, value-bound concept, distinct from the formal completeness 
of the rule on which direct effect it is based. The amended art. 19(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) turns the subjective right into an objective obligation for 
Member States to ensure that their judicial systems provide effective judicial protec-
tion. The Court, which has jurisdiction over the fundamental right, concretises it 
through subsequent decision of judicial protection. The Charter prescribes the meth-
odology that the Court is to follow. This methodology requires balancing optimal 
judicial protection with countervailing objectives of an orderly procedure, by means 
of proportionality. It yields a set of generalisable outcomes that form doctrine.
The article then further argues that judicial protection drives the development of 
what will be labelled a single code of procedure. This code is not a single codifica-
tion but rests on several normative layers, combining the primary law of the Charter 
and TEU and the relating jurisprudence of the Court with applicable EU legisla-
tion and compatible national legislation. This code steers the operation of all courts 
within the EU judicial architecture, so that Union and Member States courts adjudi-
cate EU law in a coordinated manner. The code spells out judicial protection-driven 
choices for jurisdiction, procedure and remedies for courts in both pillars. It extends 
the jurisdiction of the Court over all acts of the political branches, exercised through 
a procedure convergent with the Member State level. It also guarantees the EU juris-
diction of Member States courts based on the federal question of an individual right, 
exercised through a harmonised procedure.
Third, judicial protection takes priority in developing the EU judicial architec-
ture. It overrides conflicting principles even where formalised in the Treaties, such 
as the EU institutions’ discretion and the mutual trust between the Member States. 
Judicial protection hence forms a constitutional core of the EU legal order law that 
cannot be altered through the treaty-amendment procedure. The article concludes 
7 MacCormick (2008). Ostrom and Crawford (2005) defines institutions as “regularities of human 
action”.
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that this constitutional role for judicial protection is justified, on normative grounds. 
The European Union includes individuals through rights. Rights taken seriously 
must be underpinned by guaranteed judicial protection. Judicial protection enlists 
the judiciaries of the European Union and the Member States to counter challenges 
to these rights, first procedurally and then substantively.
The article applies this framework to the jurisprudence of the Court that has 
shaped the EU judicial architecture after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.8 
The discussion will focus on key judgments of the Court’s Grand Chamber in this 
period, with emphasis on the leading cases Otis,9 Kadi,10 ECHR,11 Rosneft,12 Por-
tuguese Judges,13 Achmea14 and, most recently, Judicial Independence in Poland.15 
These judgments have been widely discussed in academic writing. The present dis-
cussion will tease out the common theme of judicial protection that identifies and 
explains the choices that the Court has made in the transformation of the EU judicial 
architecture.
2  Institutionalising the Meta‑norm of Judicial Protection
This Part demonstrates that and how the meta-norm of judicial protection is being 
institutionalised in EU law. The starting point is the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights that now enshrines the fundamental right of everyone to receive judicial pro-
tection for his or her rights (a). This ‘right’ is a thick concept focused on the leg-
islatively intended entitlement rather than the completeness of the rule it is based 
on (b). The guaranteed judicial protection is delivered exclusively through the two-
pillared EU judicial architecture (c). The Treaty on European Union, through its 
new art. 19(1) second subparagraph and through art. 7, absorbs the content of the 
fundamental right to judicial protection, binding the Member States throughout the 
scope of application of EU law in regard to the national pillar of the EU judicial 
architecture (d). Finally, the Court concretises the requirements of judicial protec-
tion, by balancing optimal rights protection with any countervailing objectives of an 
orderly judicial procedure. The outcomes of this balancing crystallise into doctrine. 
The thus concretised Charter fundamental right becomes the highest standard for 
all procedure, prevailing also over conflicting primary EU law. Charter and related 
doctrine yield a single code of procedure for the entire EU judicial architecture (e).
8 This is not to deny that the trend started earlier. See discussion below.
9 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, Case C-199/11, 6 November 2012.
10 European Commission and UK v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (Kadi II), Case C-584/10 P, 18 July 2013.
11 Opinion 2/13: EU accession to the ECHR, 18 December 2014.
12 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty’s Treasury and Others, Case C-72/15, 28 March 2017.
13 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, Case C-64/16, 28 February 2018 
(Portuguese Judges).
14 Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV, Case C-284/16, 6 March 2018.
15 Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU,  25 July 2018 (Judicial Independence in 
Poland).
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2.1  Judicial Protection as Fundamental Right
Pre-Lisbon, the Founding Treaties of the European Union did not make textual ref-
erence to judicial protection or a right to such protection. The European Court of 
Justice had, nevertheless, started to invoke concepts such as the rule to law for the 
‘complete system of remedies’16, or the rule of law and fundamental rights17, to sup-
plement the Treaty provision on remedies before the EU courts that the Treaties pro-
vided. The ECJ had also started in the Factortame18 and Johnston19 line of cases 
to require national courts to provide relief when applying EU law. The Court there 
had referred to effectiveness of EU law and also to judicial protection to justify this 
requirement. The legal basis of judicial protection had remained unclear, though. 
It could be the rule of law or fundamental rights grounded in a general principle of 
EU law derived from the European Convention of Human Rights and comparative 
constitutional law.
The Lisbon Treaty now clarifies the fundamental right quality of judicial protec-
tion. Art. 6(1) of the amended TEU authorises the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union at the level of the Treaties.20 The Charter through its Chapter VI 
dedicated to justice rights enshrines the fundamental right to judicial protection.21 
At the head of that chapter, Charter art. 47 sets forth this right, which guarantees 
an effective remedy, access to court, fair process, and legal aid. Charter arts. 48–50 
provide supplementary guarantees primarily but not exclusively for the criminal pro-
cess, with a the presumption of innocence, the right to defence, the legality and pro-
portionality of criminal offences and penalties, and the ne bis in idem guarantee.22 
Additional procedural guarantees are provided by the several other fundamental 
rights in the Charter’s Chapter on Freedoms.23 The Charter’s fundamental right to 
16  “…[t] he rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of 
the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC Treaty, which established a com-
plete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legal-
ity of acts of the institutions”, Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, ¶ 23.
17 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Kadi I), 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 281 and 283.
18 R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433.
19 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, [1986] E.C.R.
20 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, at 19.
21 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, 2012 O.J. C 326/391, at 405. It reads in 
full “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. (1) Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance 
with the conditions laid down in this Article. (2) Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. (3) Legal aid shall be made available 
to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to jus-
tice.”.
22 Id. arts. 48–50. The Schengen-acquis contains the ne bis in idem principle of art. 54 of the Schengen 
Convention. Zoran Spasic, Case C-129/14 PPU, 27 May 2014.
23 In particular the right of the child to be heard, art. 24 of the Charter.
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judicial protection henceforth displaces the general principles as the source.24 The 
Court has articulated this consequence.25 It is visible between the Kadi I26 and Kadi 
II cases, with the latter only mentioning Charter art. 47.27 This fundamental right of 
judicial protection codified in the Charter absorbs the case-law relating to its previ-
ous manifestation as a general principle.28
2.2  Judicial Protection of Rights
The fundamental right to judicial protection serves as the master-norm for the EU 
judicial architecture because it has a clear focus.29 This is the individual right. The 
wording of the fundamental right establishes the term ‘right’ for the first time in 
primary law. It authorises an autonomous definition of the term, across the entire 
EU legal order. For purposes of judicial protection, individual right must be thick, 
evaluative concept that identifies that EU law whose practical effect courts should 
be securing. This concept of the right then is to be disassociated from important, 
related concepts, such as direct effect as well as direct applicability. The right is pri-
mary, while direct effect merely denotes one of several ways of enforcing it. Direct 
effect describes to the textual completeness of the provision so that it can be invoked 
before institutions applying EU law.
The wording of Charter art. 47 indicates four pointers for the thick concept of 
right. First, the right is to be found in the ‘law of the Union’. Thus, rules of EU law 
on all rungs of the normative hierarchy, i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary law, 
and on any subject matter, can create rights.30 Second, the rule must ‘guarantee’ the 
right. Hence the demonstrable legislative objective to protect specific interests of a 
defined or definable group is critical. Intended entitlement does not depend of the 
precise, unconditional and complete formulation of the rule on which it is based. 
Third, ‘everyone’ is the bearer of the right to judicial protection, comprising natural 
persons but also juridical persons of private law31 and of public law including the 
24 Preamble of the Charter, recital 5, (‘reaffirms’); Protocol (no 30)’Application of the Charter of Rights 
to Poland and the United Kingdom’, ¶ 6, 2012 O.J. C 326/313: “whereas the Charter reaffirms the rights, 
freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible” (emphasis added); 
Declaration (no 1) concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, ¶ 1, 2012 O.J. 
C 326/339 (‘confirms’).
25 Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission, [2011] E.C.R. I-13,085, ¶ 51: “Article 
47 of the Charter implements in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47” (emphasis added); see also Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV 
and Others, Case C-199/11, 6 November 2012, ¶ 46; ZZ, ¶ 50.
26 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Kadi I), 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 335.
27 European Commission and UK v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (Kadi II), Case C-584/10 P, 18 July 2013, ¶ 
100.
28 TEU, art. 6(3).
29 Charter of Rights, art. 51.
30 Explanations, 2007 O.J. C 303/17, at 29.
31 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
[2010] E.C.R. I-13,849, ¶¶ 38–40.
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EU itself.32 This includes all Union citizens. For them, guaranteed judicial protec-
tion for the rights that they hold qua their citizenships becomes a promise of real, 
that is reliable Citizenship.33 For third-country nationals, it means equal protection 
for their rights. Fourth, and importantly, the right is protected if it is ‘violated’. No 
author of the violation is specified. Rights are directed against public authority, of 
the European Union or the Member States, as well as against another private party. 
Public-law and private-law rights are comprised.
In its jurisprudence, the Court has been developing such a uniform concept of 
right focused on securing the intended entitlement of individuals through judicial 
protection, and regardless of the completeness of the rule it is based on. Thus, in 
primary law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines fundamental rights to 
freedom and equality, citizenship and justice, and those all create individual rights.34 
Chapter IV—solidarity—also contains genuine fundamental rights under certain 
circumstances35, not just principles within the meaning of Charter art. 53.36 Under 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Union Citizenship37 
creates rights against member states other than the citizen’s state of nationality, but 
also against the state of nationality38, and the European Union itself. Union Citizen-
ship also creates derived rights for third-country nationals.39 The fundamental free-
doms of the Treaty, which are all worded as member state obligations, nevertheless 
create individual rights throughout the single market area40, as recognised for the 
free movement of workers,41 free establishment42, the free provision of services43, 
and the free movement of goods.44
40 Cf Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case 
C-445/06, [2009] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶ 75.
41 Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v Georges 
Heylens and others, Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, ¶ 15.
42 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others, Joined Cases Case C-46/93 and Case C-48/93, [1996] 
E.C.R. I-1025, ¶ 54.
43 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. 
I-2271, ¶¶ 32, 37.
44 Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-445/06, [2009] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶¶ 22, 26.
32 Otis, ¶ 44.
33 Kochenov (2015).
34 Charter of Rights, arts. 1–46. No legal significance attaches to the terminology of rights or freedoms.
35 See International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union, ‘Viking Line’, Case 
C-438/05, [2007] ECR I-10,779; Laval un Partneri, Case C-341/05, [2007] ECR I-11767; Commission v. 
Germany, Case C-271/08, [2010] ECR I-7087 (regarding the right to collective bargaining and action of 
Art. 28 of the Charter of Rights). Further Lenaerts (2012).
36 The Explanations mention Charter arts. 25, 26 and 37 as examples of principles. They also state that 
some provisions may contain both principles and rights, referring to Charter arts. 23, 33 and 34.
37 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 20–25, 2012 O.J. 
C 326/47, at 56–57 [hereinafter TFEU].
38 H.C. Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de sociale verzekeringsbank and  Others, 
Case C-133/15, 10 May 2017.
39 Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm, Case C-40/11, 8 Nov. 2012, ¶ 67; Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEm), Case C-34/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-1177, ¶ 45.
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The direct applicability or direct effect of secondary law is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition to create a right. On the one hand, regulations are gener-
ally directly applicable45, yet each must still be intended to create a right.46 On the 
other hand, directives are generally only binding on member states47 and may not 
be directly effective, yet they can still create rights. The chamber judgment in DEB 
illustrates how the Court constructs rights under a directive. The case concerned the 
directive on non-discriminatory access to gas networks.48 The Court did not con-
sider whether the directive had direct effect. It found that the directive was intended 
to create rights for gas providers.49 The provider therefore had the fundamental right 
to legal aid for an action in damages it had suffered because of the late transpo-
sition of the directive.50 DEB hence reprises, post-Lisbon, the earlier Francovich51 
innovation. There, the Court had already recognised that the textually incomplete 
and therefore not directly effective provision of a directive could nevertheless create 
individual rights for the purposes of state liability.52 In Francovich, the Court did not 
specify the basis on which it prioritised the right over direct effect. The fundamen-
tal right to judicial protection now provides this basis. The right is primary and the 
remedy—direct effect or state liability—is secondary.53 Finally, the Court has recog-
nised that tertiary EU law can create rights.54
This concept of the individual right extends beyond substantive to procedural 
rights, for instance regarding civil procedure in the internal market55, judicial coop-
eration, and asylum procedure.56 These substantive and procedural rights have as their 
addressee the European Union or the Member States; they are public-law rights.57 But 
the concept of right also extends to private-law rights. Thus, in primary law, the Court 
45 TFEU, art. 288(2) and (4).
46 Mohamad Zakaria, Case C-23/12, 17 Jan. 2013, for art. 6(1) of Regulation 562/2006 of the Parliament 
and Council establishing the Schengen Borders Code, 2006 O.J. L 105/1.
47 TFEU, art 288(3).
48 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas (1998 O.J. L 204/1) and Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Direc-
tive 98/30/EC (2003 O.J. 2003 L 176/57).
49 DEB, ¶¶ 27–29.
50 DEB, ¶ 33.
51 Francovich and others v Italian Republic, Case C-6/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357.
52 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, Case C-6/90, [1991] E.C.R. 
I-5357, ¶¶ 17–22, 27 and 41.
53 That being said, this article does not argue that all remedies, primary such as direct effect and second-
ary such as state liability, are equally effective in protecting rights and particular social and consumer 
rights, which has been convincingly been refuted, see Reich (2017), at 122–27.
54 EU Civil Service Tribunal, Martine Fouwels v Commission, Case F-8/05 REV, 20 September 2011), 
¶ 53.
55 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, Case C-324/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 
142.
56 Majid auch Madzhdi Shiri v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl, Case C-201/16, 265 October 
2017.
57 Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, 26 February 2013, ¶ 22.
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interprets the prohibition by TFEU art. 10158 of anti-competitive agreements or prac-
tices to create for the competitor private-law rights to have these declared unlawful and 
to receive damages.59 The Court has also held that Union Citizenship60 and non-dis-
crimination61 create private-law rights. This is also true for the fundamental freedoms 
of persons.62 These freedoms are not only functional market rights, but fundamental 
rights of each individual against powerful other private parties.63 This fundamental 
right-rationale is lacking for the free movement of goods, however, and consequently 
that freedom does not yield a private law-right.64 Secondary EU law can also create 
private-law rights.65 Thus, in Muñoz, the Court concluded that Regulation 2200/96 
on fair trading creates rights against infringing private parties.66 In L’Oreal, the Court 
found Regulation 40/9467 to confer a trademark right against other economic operators 
engaged in trade.68 Directives create private law-rights, although the Court’s jurispru-
dence limits their enforceability. There is no horizontal direct effect of directive. These 
therefore may only be enforced indirectly through a cause of action in national law.69
2.3  Judicial Protection Through the EU Judicial Architecture
Judicial protections is ensured exclusively through the EU judicial architecture. The 
Member States cannot escape judicial protection neither unilaterally nor cooperatively. 
In Achmea, the ECJ Grand Chamber isolates the EU judicial architecture from any paral-
lel network of international courts or tribunals ensuring judicial protection for rights.70 
58 TFEU, art. 101.
59 Otis, 6 Nov. 2012), ¶ 40. State aid that is illegal under TFEU post-Lisbon art. 108 (3), 2012 O.J. C 
326/47, at 92, triggers the corresponding right on the competitor to have the subsidy declared invalid and 
to request that it be paid back. See Transformateurs de saumon v Commission, Case C-335/90, [1991] 
E.C.R. I-5505, ¶ 12.
60 TFEU, art. 20; Ferlini, Case C-411/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-8081.
61 Id., art. 18; Defrenne II, Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455.
62 Id., art. 46; Walrave and Koch, Case 36/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1405; Id. art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 67; 
Viking Line, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,229.
63 cf Charter of Rights, art. 15(2).
64 Sapod Audic v Eco-Emballages SA, Case C-159/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-5031, ¶ 74.
65 It ‘must be examined on a case-by-case basis whether its provisions confer rights on individuals’, 
Opinion of Advocate General Gelhood in Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA, Superior Fruiticola SA
 and Frumar Ltd, Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd, Case C-253/00, [2002] I-7291, ¶¶ 23, 47.
66 Muñoz, Case C-253/00, [2002] E.C.R. 7312, ¶¶ 27, 31.
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, 1994 OJ L 11/1 (now Directive 
2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council to approximate the laws of the Member 
States relating to trade marks (codified version), 2008 O.J. L 299/5.
68 L’Oréal, [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 54. But the regulation did not protect the interest of the proprietor in 
prohibiting the sale of a product bearing a trade mark through an online marketplace.
69 Private-law rights still result from the primary law that the directive implements, Werner Mangold v 
Rüdiger Helm, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-9981.
70 Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v Achmea BV, Case C-284/16, 6 March 2018, ¶ 36: “In that 
context, in accordance with Article 19 TEU, it is for the national courts and tribunals and the Court of 
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Based on TFEU arts. 26771 and 34472, the Court there effectively declares investor-state 
tribunals established by treaties between Member States impermissible that would inter-
pret and apply EU law and the rights of investors derived therefrom. This is the exclusive 
competence of the CJEU and the Member States courts. Nor can the European Union 
escape judicial protection through this architecture, as the ECHR Opinion makes clear: 
the EU is barred from conferring jurisdiction on the European Court of Human Rights to 
rule on the fundamental rights conferred by the Charter.
2.4  Judicial Protection as Objective Obligation: Art. 19(2) TEU and Art. 7 TEU
Institutionalising judicial protection as a fundamental right is thus powerful. Yet, the 
power is blunted by the strict threshold of application that applies to all fundamental 
rights of the Charter. Under Charter art. 51(1), the Charter only applies when Mem-
ber States are implementing other EU law.73 Since Åkerberg Fransson, this requires 
that EU law is determinative in the case at hand.74 The Court’s jurisprudence on this 
criterion has become increasingly exigeant, possibly after a pushback from the Mem-
ber States constitutional courts. The Court now requires a connection between the EU 
and national measures which goes beyond the subject-matters covered being closely 
related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other. Indicators 
are whether the national measure is intended to implement a provision of EU law, 
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law even if it is capable 
of indirectly affecting EU law, and whether it affects specific rules of EU law.75
Given these limits, the new TEU art. 19(1) second subparagraph crucially sup-
plements the Charter in institutionalising the meta-norm of judicial protection. This 
provision obligates the Member States to provide for remedies sufficient to ensure 
Footnote 70 (continued)
Justice to ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of 
the rights of individuals under that law”.
71 Art. 267 provides in relevant part that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall have juris-
diction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; […] Where such a 
question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it consid-
ers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a 
ruling thereon. […]”.
72 Art. 344 provides that “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.”.
73 Charter of Rights, art. 51(1).
74 Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, 26 February 2013, ¶¶ 17 to 23 states that the Charter binds the 
Member States whenever EU is determinative of the facts. In cases such as Zakaria, ¶¶ 39, 40; and 
Demarchi Gino Sas, Case C-177/17, 7 September 2017, ¶¶ 22, 21, the Court examines this as a separate 
precondition for the applicability of Charter art. 47. In other cases, the Court immediately proceeds to 
the inquiry whether a right under Charter art. 47 is implicated, see Opinion of Advocate General Bot in 
Agrokonsulting-04, ¶ 21 (a judicial decision concerning a person outside of her EU rights does not fall 
under art. CFR 47).
75 Julián Hernández and Others, Case C-198/13, 10 July 2014, ¶ 34, Paoletti and Others, Case 
C-218/15, 6 October 2016, ¶ 14.
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effective legal protection.76 In Portuguese Judges77 the ECJ Grand Chamber has 
seized the chance to interpret and apply this provision, rather than the fundamental 
right to judicial protection as the Advocate General had recommended. The case 
concerned salary sacrifices of judges imposed by Portugal as part of an EU bail-
out programme. The Court found that the provision applies throughout the scope 
of application of EU law. Each Member State must comply with it qua its member-
ship in the European Union, binding it to the value of the rule of law laid down in 
TEU art. 2. The Court expressly rejected the stricter condition that Charter art. 51(1) 
imposes on the applicability of the fundamental right to judicial protection. The 
Court therefore tested the sacrifices against TEU art. 19, finding them compatible 
as they were not directed against the judiciary, but applied across the public sector.
Portuguese Judges has also clarified that TEU Art. 19(2)(2) as to its content is 
co-extensive with the requirements of the entire Charter art. 47.78 Beyond the word-
ing, it therefore contains requirements not just of remedies but also of an independ-
ent judiciary and a fair process. There exists a conduit between the fundamental 
right and the State’s obligation to provide judicial protection. Finally, Portuguese 
Judges hints at direct applicability of that obligation. In other words, where national 
law fails to provide for the necessary rules, a court may have recourse to it to fill the 
gaps.79 The applicability of this objective obligation to provide for effective judicial 
protection goes beyond the fundamental right, though. It is not tied to a national 
measure implementing EU law in the above strict sense. Nor is it necessary that an 
individual right be demonstrably present in a concrete case.
TEU art. 19 as interpreted by Portuguese Judges effectuates the meta-norm of 
judicial protection by overriding the limits that Charter art. 51 imposes. It becomes 
the vehicle with which the requirements of the fundamental right to judicial protec-
tion can be applied to assess structural problems of the Member States judicial sys-
tem.80 It is also the vehicle to address such problems, by the European Commission 
and the judiciary of other Member States.
In Independence of the Judiciary in Poland81, the Court’s Grand Chamber ques-
tions the independence of the judiciary in Poland after the recent government 
reforms still meeting the essential requirements of the fundamental right to judi-
cial protection. The findings of the European Commission that independence is not 
guaranteed can and must be relied upon by the courts of other Member States. That 
barred the requested extradition of an individual from Ireland to Poland pursuant to 
a European Arrest Warrant. The judgment is clear that judicial protection acquires 
the properties of a hard meta-norm for the EU judicial architecture. It overrides the 
76 The French and German text use “necessary” instead of “sufficient”.
77 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, Case C-64/16, 28 February 2018.
78 Portuguese Judges, ¶¶ 27, 29.
79 Opinion of AG Mendozzi in Portuguese Judges, ¶ 61; “Thus, that second subparagraph is not aimed 
directly at the national judges, but is intended to ensure that possibilities of remedies exist in the Member 
States so that each individual is able to benefit from such protection in all the fields in which EU law is 
applicable” (internal citations omitted).
80 Waelbroeck and Oliver (2017).
81 Minister for Justice and Equality (Case C-216/18 PPU), 25 July 2018.
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principle of mutual trust between the Member States that the Court had declared 
foundational for that architecture. In fact, the Court goes further. Independence of 
the judiciary now is one of the minimum conditions that Art. 7 of the TEU estab-
lishes for membership in the European Union.
Read together, Portuguese Judges and Independence turn the requirements of the 
fundamental right to judicial protection into a standard for the internal legal orders 
of a State qua its membership of the Union.
2.5  Judicial Protection and a Single Code of Procedure for the EU Judicial 
Architecture
As meta-norm, judicial protection drives the development of a single code of pro-
cedure enabling the courts in the two-pillared judicial architecture to deliver effec-
tive and consistent protection. This section discusses the legal underpinnings of that 
demand, and shows that the Charter, the related doctrine, and the compliant proce-
dure of the EU and the Member States form such a single code of procedure com-
prising the two pillars of the EU judicial architecture, with the overarching objective 
of protecting rights in EU law.
Legally, the fundamental right to judicial protection is a subjective right.82 All 
fundamental rights limit the exercise of public authority in individual instances.83 
But judicial protection is also the right to a state of affairs, beyond a specific omis-
sion or action.84 It generates requirements and standards for general organisation 
and procedure as well for individual judicial decisions. While formulated with more 
precision than others, the fundamental right to judicial protection still is intensely 
dependent on authoritative concretisation at a lower level of abstraction. The Court 
provides this concretisation, and its decisions relating to judicial protection have an 
effect that goes beyond the exemplary value that all decisions on fundamental rights 
have.85 These decisions can be generalised, they generate judicial doctrine. It relates 
to Charter rights and therefore partakes in its normative position, enjoying primacy 
over any conflicting procedure in Member State law. While this doctrine differs 
from full rules both in form and authority86, it potentially entails full harmoniza-
tion, beyond minimum harmonization, of national procedure. This doctrine can be 
directly applied by courts having jurisdiction.
82 Kadi II.
83 The ECJ has invalidated EU legislation under different Charter rights: for instance data protection in 
art. 8 (Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, Joined Cases Case C-92/09 
and Case C-93/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-11,063); and non-discrimination in art. 21 (Association belge des 
Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and others v Council, Case C-236/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-773). The 
Court also interprets the EU legislation to conform to fundamental rights, for instance art. 4 on the pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual treatment (N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. v 
Refugee Applications Commissioner, Joined Cases Case C-411/10 and Case C-493/10, 21 Dec. 2011).
84 MacCormick, at 187–205.
85 Id, at 204.
86 Id, at 39–60.
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The Court’s judgment in Baláž illustrates this doctrine-making. It concerned the 
execution of a financial penalty pursuant to Council Framework Decision 2009/299/
JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penal-
ties.87 The ECJ Grand Chamber there stated that, to comply with Charter art. 47, the 
national court entering the penalty must have full jurisdiction and apply a specific 
procedure that the Court defined.88 As part of this procedure, the decision imposing 
the penalty must be made available to the individual in a language she can under-
stand; and there must be clear instructions on how to appeal, within what time–limit, 
representation, and legal aid.
The competence of the Court for developing this doctrine lies in both the general 
responsibility as the ultimate arbiter of EU law pursuant to TEU art. 19(1) and in 
the specific responsibility to promote the fundamental right to judicial protection.89 
The capacity of the Court to develop it is rooted in methodology. As to that meth-
odology, Charter art. 52(1) determines that judicial protection has the structure of a 
Dworkinian principle. Judicial protection thus is to be optimised by effectuating the 
underlying right as much as possible vis-à-vis a private or public contestation. This 
encompasses using procedural institutions that have been developed in national and 
supranational law, but ultimately is a function of the underlying right. The optimal 
judicial protection then is limited by countervailing objectives. Charter art. 52(1) 
refers to ‘general objectives recognised in EU law’. A functioning procedure, with 
legal certainty, judicial economy, and a legitimate claimant, can be such objectives. 
Member States’ procedural autonomy as such is not an objective. It is for the Court 
to recognise the goals underlying national procedure as objectives of EU law. Pro-
portionality becomes the mechanism for balancing optimal judicial protection and 
the countervailing objectives. The outcome of this balancing provides not just the 
right answer for the case at hand but constitutes doctrine.
The articulation of such doctrine impugns the space for particular-plural proce-
dures of the Member States, protected by the subsidiarity principle. Subsidiarity 
calls for respecting national legislatures’ value-judgments on the procedure of their 
courts.90 Charter art. 51(1) subjects the Charter–related jurisprudence to this princi-
ple. The Court accommodates it by according a margin of appreciation to the Mem-
ber States’ legislatures and courts. The margin is reflected in the jurisprudence that 
the national procedure as a system must comply with Charter art. 47, rather than 
each individual rule. There can thus be alternative procedural avenues to achieve the 
requisite level of protection. The Charter-prescribed methodology yields uniform 
requirements, but these allow for plural modes of implementation.
87 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
to financial penalties (2005 O.J. L 76/16), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA 
(2009 O.J. 2009 L 81/24).
88 Baláž, Case C-60/12, 14 Nov. 2013, ¶ 47; also Opinion of AG Sharpston, 18 July 2013, ¶¶ 82–84.
89 Charter of Rights, art. 51(1).
90 For criminal and civil procedure, TFEU art. 67(1) provides: “The Union shall constitute an area of 
freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal traditions of the 
member states”(emphasis added).
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The second prong of the Court’s methodology references the rich jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights.91 The Convention lays down justice rights in arts. 6 and 13, 
as well as subject-specific procedural guarantees in arts. 3, 5 and 7.92 The ECtHR’s 
methodological approach also balances judicial protection with countervailing 
objectives expressed in the national procedure, seen as a system, through propor-
tionality.93 It produces a rich reservoir of outcomes, that often reflect the consensus 
in the Contracting States. Charter arts. 52(3) and 53 require the Court of Justice 
to follow their interpretation by the ECtHR. The case-law of that court on judicial 
protection becomes the benchmark for the Court of Justice in the interpretation of 
the Charter. Adopting it provides the Court with particular legitimacy when setting 
central-uniform doctrine in place of particular plural procedures at Member State 
level.94 This legitimacy explains the rich referencing of the Court to the Strasbourg 
case law.95 Charter art. 52(3) only permits the Court to go beyond this benchmark.96 
The Charter already codifies such ‘excess’, pre-Lisbon case-law of the ECJ. Char-
ter art. 47 covers all the rights conferred on individuals by EU law whereas ECHR 
art. 6 only protects private rights (in national law)97; Charter art. 49(1) prescribes 
that more lenient penal law applies retroactively; and Charter art. 50 provides for 
a transborder ne bis in idem guarantee. The interpretation of the Charter rights by 
the Court of Justice has also reflected on the interpretation of the Convention by the 
European Court of Human Rights.98 Convention and Charter become mutually rein-
forcing in setting procedural standards.
The Charter and related doctrine hence set the standards for all procedure within 
the scope of application of the Founding Treaties. They set standards for the EU 
legislature in adopting procedural legislation99, for which it has competences regard-
ing for instance consumer protection100, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
91 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Łukasz Marcin Bonda, Case C-489/10, 11 Dec. 2011, ¶ 43.
92 Explanations, art. 47.
93 Golder v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 524, ¶ 36; Klass and others v Germany (1994) 18 
EHRR 305, ¶ 49; Ashingdane v the United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528, ¶ 55–57; and Lithgow and 
others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329, ¶ 194.
94 Further Ward (2009) 329.
95 Exemplary is Samet Ardic, Case C-571/17 PPU, 22 December 2017, ¶¶ 74, 75. Further de Búrca 
(2013), at 174–175.
96 Under Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland [GC], no 24833/94, ECHR 2005-VI, the ECtHR 
will only assess the general level of judicial protection under the Charter against the Convention, but not 
individual decisions.
97 ECtHR, Coorplan-Jenni GmbH and Hascic v Austria, No 10523/02, 27 July 2006, ¶ 56. Further Har-
ris et al. (2014), at 391–392.
98 ECtHR, Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, [GC], No. 14939/03, 10 Feb. 2009 (interpreting the concept 
‘idem’ in light of the case-law of the ECJ, with emphasis on the identity of the facts instead of their legal 
classification).
99 Commission v Belgium, Case C-155/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-939.
100 On the basis of TFEU art. 114, see Regulation (EU) 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for con-
sumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. L 165/1. 
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matters101 and asylum.102, They also set the standards for the Member States legis-
latures. Those retain the residual legislative competence for the procedure of their 
courts when applying EU law, TEU art. 4(1). The Court has been referring to this 
competence as ‘autonomy’ of the Member States.103 But the exercise of this com-
petence must comply with the fundamental right of judicial protection enshrined 
in Charter art. 47. This is true regardless of whether it was specifically enacted to 
implement EU law. The fundamental right requires the Member States not just to 
respect, but also to take positive legislative action fill any gaps in their procedure.104 
The national judge may resort directly to Charter art. 47(1) supplying any requisite 
supplementary rules. Importantly, however, the general condition set forth in Char-
ter art. 51(1) applies. The Charter’s fundamental right to judicial protection there-
fore only binds the Member States when ‘implementing’ other EU law. Finally, the 
fundamental right to judicial protection sets standards for the Contracting Parties 
when amending the Founding Treaties on the EU judicature. The Court has con-
firmed this controversial effect in its recent Rosneft-judgment that will be discussed 
infra.
The following parts of the article will trace the development of this code of pro-
cedure, primarily by reference to the cases of the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Justice. Part 3 turns to the Union pillar and Part 4 to the pillar of the Mem-
ber States courts.
3  The Single Code of Procedure (I). Judicial Protection and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union
The Court of Justice of the European Union constitutes the first pillar of the EU 
judicial architecture. In that pillar, the meta-norm of judicial protection drives 
a dynamic expansion of judicial review over the acts of other EU institutions and 
See also Communication from the Commission, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collec-
tive Redress’, COM(2013) 401.
Footnote 100 (continued)
101 Under the competences for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, TEU, art. 3(1) and Part III 
Title VI of the TFEU, arts 82–86. See for criminal procedure for instance Directive 2010/64 on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 2010 O.J. L 280/1; Directive 2012/13 on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings, 2012 O.J. L 142/1; and Directive 2013/4 on the right of 
access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right 
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and 
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, 2013 O.J. L 294/1; for private law procedure see 
for instance Regulation (EC) 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. L 
199/1; and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 Creating a European order for payment procedure, 2006 O.J. 
L 399/1.
102 TFEU, arts. 67–89.
103 TEU, art. 4(1). It reads “In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union 
in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, Case C-240/09, 8 March 
2011, ¶ 47; and Star Storage and Others, Case C-439/14 and Case C-488/14, 15 Sept. 2016, ¶ 46.
104 Otis, ¶ 64 (independence of court requires procedure legislation in national law).
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bodies. What is more, it crystallises into a formal meta-norm, displacing conflict-
ing primary law purporting to limit judicial review in the interest of the authority 
of EU law. On this basis, the Court’s jurisprudence has been closing gaps in judicial 
review that the Treaties leave for non-justiciable political decision-making by the 
EU institutions (a). The meta-norm of judicial protection also drives the evolution of 
the procedure that the CJEU follows in exercising its jurisdiction. As a consequence, 
this procedure converging with that of the Member States (b).
3.1  The Jurisdiction of the CJEU over All Acts of the EU Institutions
The Lisbon Treaty has confirmed the jurisdiction of the CJEU for judicial review 
of EU acts.105 The Treaty has also established that this jurisdiction extends beyond 
the EU institutions within the meaning of TEU art. 13 to all EU bodies of the EU. 
But the Treaty continues to restrict the substantive scope of this judicial review. Post-
Lisbon, TEU art. 24(1)(2) removes acts of the Council taken under the Common For-
eign and Security Policy, excepting only those acts that can be challenged in a direct 
action pursuant to TFEU art. 263(4). Such a direct action for annulment will have to 
meet the narrow locus standi requirements, though.106 This restriction preserves non-
justiciable executive, intergovernmental discretion in external EU action.107
Yet, judicial protection does not tolerate enclaves of non-justiciability. Where 
individual rights created in EU law are contested, there the Court ought to have 
jurisdiction to review the institution’s act, in both direct and indirect actions, with-
out restrictions. The meta-norm of judicial protection directs the Court to limit the 
scope of the Treaty rule through authoritative interpretation. It emerges as a formal 
meta-norm within the primary law.
The Court has built up to this result incrementally in its case-law.108 The 2017 
judgment of the ECJ Grand Chamber in Rosneft109 now establishes clearly that judi-
cial review covers Common Foreign and Security Policy acts that affect individual 
rights, regardless of whether the action is direct or indirect. The case concerned the 
EU sanctions regime regarding Russia, based on Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP 
105 TEU, art. 19; TFEU, arts. 251–281; Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/210.
106 TEU art. 24(1), in relevant part, reads as follows: "The [CJEU] shall not have jurisdiction [over the 
CFSP], with the exception of its jurisdiction […] to review the legality of certain decisions as provided 
for by the  second paragraph of Article 275 of the [TFEU]". The relevant part of TFEU article 275(2) 
reads as follows: "the Court shall have jurisdiction […] to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance 
with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legal-
ity of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons [adopted under the 
CFSP]".
107 See Koutrakos (2018). On the extension of general principles of national constitutional law to foreign 
relations see Sitaraman and Wuerth (2015) (for the USA).
108 Cases discussing these issues include P H v. Council et al. Case C-155/14; Elitaliana SpA v. EULEX 
Kosovo, Case C-439/13 P; and Opinion 2/13, Accession to the ECHR.
109 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty’s Treasury and Others, Case C-72/15, 28 March 28 2017.
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and Council Regulation 833/2014.110 Rosneft’s judicial review action in national 
court challenged the British ‘Export Control (Russia, Crimea, and Sevastopol Sanc-
tions) (Amendment) Order 2014’ which gave effect to some of the EU sanctions in 
the United Kingdom. The Grand Chamber found it had jurisdiction for the prelimi-
nary ruling, which the UK High Court had requested on the validity of the Council 
decision111, because of the fundamental right of Rosneft to receive judicial protec-
tion against this Common Foreign and Security Policy act.112 Judicial protection is 
the rationale of the judgment, which only refers in passing to the rule of law.113 The 
Court could and did leave open whether the Partnership Agreement between the EU 
and Russia creates individual rights that require such protection. For such a right is 
the Charter’s fundamental freedom to conduct a business114 that Rosneft is a bearer 
of and that the sanctions limit.
Rosneft now takes that final step. There, the Court gives effect to judicial pro-
tection through the corrective interpretation of the TFEU, because otherwise there 
would have been no judicial review. In Rosneft, judicial protection overrides the 
considered, recently expressed position of the Contracting Parties expressed in the 
Treaty. The Rosneft-Court supports this move to establish judicial protection as a 
formal meta-norm by referencing the established Les Verts doctrine. On the basis 
that the Treaty provides for a complete system of remedies, the Court in Les Verts 
had also corrected the Treaty provision that Parliament had no standing to bring 
actions for annulment. Les Verts, however, had argued with the rule of law. Rosneft 
now absorbs the Les Verts doctrine into the fundamental right to judicial protection. 
According to the Court in Rosneft, it is “inherent” in the Union’s “complete system 
of legal remedies or procedures that persons bringing proceedings must, when an 
action is brought before a national court or tribunal, have the right to challenge the 
legality of provisions contained in European Union acts”.115
The Court thus claws back its jurisdiction to the extent necessary for judicial pro-
tection. In Rosneft, judicial protection becomes a hard or formal meta-norm within 
EU primary law. Where an individual right needs protection, there the Court may set 
aside a limiting Treaty rule. The legal basis of this meta-norm function is, however, 
difficult to establish. Art. 6(1) incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights only 
on the same normative rung as the Treaties. Charter art. 51(1) correspondingly only 
names the EU institutions as Charter rights addresses, but not the Contracting Par-
ties themselves.116 The argument that the fundamental right of judicial protection is 
110 EU sanctions are enacted in two steps. The Council adopts a decision under the CFSP, TEU Title V, 
Chapter 2, which is then implemented in EU law through a regulation adopted under TFEU art. 215.
111 Rosneft also confirms that the regulation adopted under TFEU art. 215 is within the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU, at ¶¶ 105–106.
112 Id, ¶¶ 69–75.
113 Id, ¶ 72.
114 Charter of Rights, art. 16.
115 Rosneft, ¶¶ 67–68 (Emphasis added).
116 Charter art. 51(1).
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the standard for the Treaty-based jurisdiction of the Court can nevertheless be made. 
The starting point is that the Contracting Parties of the Founding Treaties are bound 
by the European Convention of Human Rights and its judicial protection guaran-
tees.117 This creates the presumption that the Treaties comply with the ECHR and 
therefore with the corresponding right of judicial protection enshrined in Charter 
art. 47. Furthermore, Charter art. 51(1) requires the Court itself to respect and pro-
mote Charter art. 47 when interpreting the Treaties.
The decisive step in Rosneft is cast into sharper relief when seen against the back-
ground of other constellations in which the Court had to confront the compatibility 
of Treaty-defined judicial review with the fundamental right to judicial protection. 
Prior to Lisbon, the Court of Justice had already stated that judicial protection had 
to be respected and demonstrated a willingness to correct the Treaty procedure.118 In 
other cases, it had deferred to the Contracting Parties to draw the consequences for 
the Treaty procedure.119 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court 
had established that Charter art. 47 is the yardstick for primary law and that it is 
ready to indicate the consequences should the standard not be met. In Chalkor, the 
Court stated that Charter art. 47 requires effective judicial review of EU acts in law 
and fact and that this review is arranged in the Founding Treaties.120 The Chalkor-
Court suggests that the EU legislature must supplement the Treaties, that would oth-
erwise fall short of the requisite judicial protection. The judicial review provided for 
by the Treaties of Commission decisions penalising anticompetitive conduct is not 
contrary to Charter art. 47, because the review of legality provided for in TFEU art. 
263 is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the 
fine provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.121 In Sugars, the Court finds that 
“the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of TFEU art 263 
TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial 
protection”, although it cautions against setting aside those “conditions laid down 
in that Treaty”.122 The Sugars-Court could shy away from the final step because the 
plaintiff there could initiative an indirect action under TFEU art. 267 TFEU.
117 Charter art. 51(1).
118 In Evropaïki Dynamiki v EMSA, Case T-70/05, [2010] E.C.R. II-313, the General Court established 
beyond the wording of EC art. 230(1) that acts of created EU bodies were also reviewable. The Lisbon 
Treaty has amended TFEU art. 263(1) accordingly.
119 Namely regarding the standing of private parties for direct actions pre-Lisbon EC. In UPA, the Court 
stated that the primary law needed to provide judicial protection, but then referred to the constituent 
power. Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, Case C-50/00 P, [2002] E.C.R. I-6677, ¶ 43, and 
Commission v Jégo-Quéré, Case C-263/02 P, [2004] E.C.R. I-3425, ¶ 33.
120 Chalkor, [2011] E.C.R. I-13,085, ¶ 53; Otis, 6 November 2012, ¶ 56.
121 Chalkor, [2011] E.C.R. I-13,085, ¶ 53; also Otis, ¶ 56, relating to the penalties for undertakings 
engaged in anticompetitive behaviour in secondary law.
122 T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, Case C-456/13 P, 28 April 2015, at ¶ 44.
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3.2  Procedure
Charter art. 47 governs not just the jurisdiction but also the procedure of the EU 
courts. The demands of optimal protection through procedure and any counter-
vailing objectives of an orderly procedure are essentially the same for Union and 
national procedure.123 The outcomes of the balancing should therefore crystallise 
into doctrine for both union and national courts. The Court has indeed been transfer-
ring procedural institutions, bottom-up from the national to the Union level and top-
down from the Union to the national level.
Bottom-up, the Court transfers to the EU level doctrine relating to the right to 
judicial protection it had established originally for the procedure of the Member 
States courts. The Kadi cases highlight this for the right to a defence and the stand-
ard of judicial review of adverse administrative decisions.124 These cases concerned 
EU measures implementing UN Security Council asset freezing resolutions. The 
General Court was to review the Commission acts designating Yassin Kadi.125 In 
Kadi I, the Commission had done so under Regulation 881/2002, without commu-
nicating the reasons and without hearing Kadi.126 In the appeal decision, the Court 
stated that EU acts infringing individual rights are subject to judicial review by the 
EU courts. It then defined the standard of such review by reference to Heylens.127 
That early judgment had established that adverse administrative decisions of Mem-
ber States authorities must be motivated in such a way that they can be effectively 
reviewed.128 The Court in Kadi I transferred this standard to the EU level, demand-
ing that EU acts also have to be motivated to enable review. The Court therefore 
annulled Regulation 881/2002 that did not to require motivation. The subsequent 
case Kadi II concerned the amended Regulation 881/2002.129 Under it, the Commis-
sion had provided Kadi with a statement of the summary grounds it had obtained 
from the UN Security Council. The Court referred to the recent case of ZZ where it 
had discussed the fundamental right of defence and the relating standard of judicial 
review of national acts taken on security grounds.130 There, the Court had defined a 
balance between effective judicial review and legitimate security concerns, demand-
ing that the individual must know the main grounds that the adverse administrative 
123 For instance Groupe Gascogne, 26 Nov. 2013 (excessive length of the proceedings before the Gen-
eral Court).
124 Kadi I, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 53, 336; Kadi II, 18 July 2013.
125 See de Búrca (2010).
126 Council Regulation 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against cer-
tain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, 2002 O.J. 139/9 (as amended). Its Annex 
I contains a list, which is regularly reviewed, of organisations, entities and persons suspected of being 
involved in terrorist activities.
127 Kadi I, ¶¶ 53, 336. The reliance on the Heylens precedent is remarkable for case-law exists that the 
lack of motivation of a Commission decision constitutes its unlawfulness, for instance Germany v Com-
mission, Case C-329/93, [1996] I-5151, ¶ 22.
128 ZZ, ¶ 61.
129 Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending Regulation No 881/2002, 
2009 O.J. 2009 L 346/42.
130 Kadi II, ¶ 100.
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decision is based on, either from the decision itself or by obtaining disclosure of 
those grounds in the judicial proceedings. In Kadi II, the Court transferred this 
standard to the EU level, concluding that the Commission must give reasons that are 
“individual, specific, and concrete”.131
Top-down, the Court has also transferred doctrine relating to the right to a fair 
process from the national to the EU level. In Otis, having declared that the EU 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of EU acts, the Court stated 
that the equality of arms derived from that provision is valid both in national and 
EU proceedings. BEG confirms that legal aid must be accorded in similar condi-
tions in proceedings against national and EU acts.132 The Court has emphasised this 
sameness also for the countervailing objectives. Thus, the respect of res judicata is 
equally valid for both national and EU procedures133, as is ne ultra petita.134 Both 
procedures may legitimately provide for time-limits in the interest of legal certainty, 
provided they meet the proportionality test.135
Uniform EU procedure effectively pre-empts the national procedure where a case 
before a Member State court concerns the validity of EU act. Doctrine holds that the 
Member States courts then are to follow the same procedure as the EU courts. The 
Court has affirmed this in Unibet, relating to the interim relief that national courts 
can grant against EU acts. The Court there set the uniform-central rules on interim 
relief against EU acts granted by either union or national courts expressly apart from 
the particular-plural rules that continue to govern interim relief against national acts 
otherwise.136 Still, Unibet suggests that the fundamental right to judicial protection 
demands there must be interim relief against both EU and Member State acts under 
similar conditions.137
The liability of the legislatures of the European Union and the Member States 
for violating individual rights is also converging.138 The template here has been the 
liability of the European Union before the EU judicature, which presupposes that a 
higher norm confers a right which has been violated in a qualified manner.139 That 
criterion protects the EU legislature’s broad discretion in economic and certain other 
matters.140 The Court has transferred these criteria to Member States liability. In so 
doing, it has explicitly recognized that the protection of an individual right must be 
131 Id. ¶¶ 117–134. Such review needs to balance judicial protection and the respect for UN Charter art. 
24 and the international anti-terrorism regime, an objective within the meaning of CFR art. 52(1), id. ¶¶ 
103, 131.
132 cf DEB, ¶ 6.
133 Commission v Luxembourg, Case C-526/08 [2010] E.C.R. I-6151, ¶ 26; ThyssenKrupp Nirosta v 
Commission, Case C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2359, ¶ 123.
134 British Airways v Commission, Case C-122/16 P (delivered Nov. 14, 2017).
135 Bell & Ross v OHIM, Case C-426/10 P, [2011] ECR I-8849, ¶ 42.
136 Id. ¶ 79.
137 Id. ¶ 81.
138 Liability of the Union for unlawful acts has its base in TFEU post-Lisbon art. 340, whereas 
that of the Member State is considered to be inherent in the system of the Treaty, Günter Fuß v Stadt 
Halle, Case C-429/09, [2010] ECR I-12167.
139 Schöppenstedt, Case 5/71, [1971] E.C.R. 975.
140 HNL, Case 83/76, [1978] E.C.R. 1209; Id.; Bergaderm v Commission, Case C-352/98 P, [2000] 
E.C.R. I-5291, ¶ 41.
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the same against infringements by either the EU or the Member States. Methodo-
logically, the discretion of the democratically accountable legislatures is recognised 
as a countervailing objective, to be balanced with effective judicial protection in the 
same fashion on both the EU and Member State level. As a result, in general a Mem-
ber State legislature is liable for a breach of EU law only if it manifestly and gravely 
disregarded the limits of its discretion.141 By contrast, where the EU law obligation 
is clear, leaving no discretion, there a breach entails liability. That is the case for 
non-transposition of a directive142 and pre-empted legislation.143
4  The Single Code of Procedure (II). Judicial Protection 
and the Member States Courts
This judicatures of the Member States form the second pillar of the EU judicial 
architecture.144 Pre-Lisbon, the Court had continuously stated that, in the absence of 
EU law, it is for the Member States to determine jurisdiction and procedure of their 
courts even when applying EU law.145 Yet, Judicial protection overrides this norm, 
driving towards the central-uniform construction of jurisdiction and procedure and 
shaping the vertical dimension of the code of procedure. Accordingly, the Court’s 
doctrine under Charter art. 47 has been guaranteeing jurisdiction of national courts 
over rights conferred by EU law (a). The Charter-related doctrine has also been har-
monising the procedure of national courts (b).
4.1  The Jurisdiction of Member State Courts over Rights Under EU law—the EU 
Federal Question
The Lisbon Treaty leaves unchanged the decentralised judicial architecture that does 
not establish first instance EU courts with general jurisdiction. This is paired with 
the expectation that the Member States court apply EU law, expressed in the refer-
ral procedure, TFEU art. 267. The Member States courts are to exercise jurisdic-
tion that is grounded in EU law, not national law. The basis of this jurisdiction had, 
141 Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and others, Case C-568/08, [2010] ECR 
I-12,655, ¶ 87; earlier Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
Case C-35/11, [2006] I-11,753, ¶ 212; Brasserie du pêcheur, [1996] E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 47.
142 Erich Dillenkofer and others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined Cases Case C-178/94, Case 
C-179/94, Case C-188/94, Case C-189/94 and Case C-190/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-4845 (non-transposition 
of directive).
143 TFEU, art 2(2), ex parte Hedley Lomas, Case C-5/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2553, and Commission v Den-
mark, Case C-23/94, [1994] E.C.R. I-3450 (pre-empted legislation).
144 TEU art. 4(1).
145 Confirmed post-Lisbon in Case C-93/12, Agrokonsulting-04, 27 June 2013,¶ 35; Bund für Umwelt 
und Naturschutz Deutschland (intervening party: Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co. KG), Case 
C-115/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-3673, ¶ 43 9 (hereinafter Trianel).
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however, never been identified. Judicial protection now provides that basis. Charter 
art. 47(1) and (2) requires an effective remedy before a competent tribunal. While 
formulated as a subjective right, the provision obligates national courts to deliver 
such remedy. It also empowers them to do so. This entails the jurisdiction of these 
courts to review EU law in fact and in law. The jurisdiction is guaranteed directly 
by Charter art. 47. It does not depend on nor can it be interfered with by Member 
State legislation.146 As the fundamental right serves to protect rights in EU law, this 
guaranteed jurisdiction is predicated on the presence of an individual right in the 
concrete case. The individual right becomes the ‘federal question’ that turns national 
courts into juges de droit communautaire.
The judgments of the ECJ Grand Chamber in ZZ and Otis articulate this doctrine. 
In ZZ, the Court was concerned with the review by a UK court of an administrative 
decision denying a Union citizen entry without fully stating the underlying reasons. 
It stated that Charter art. 47 itself was both the source of obligations of the national 
court and the basis of its jurisdiction to review in law and fact the administrative deci-
sion, regardless of whether this power was provided in full in domestic law.147 In Otis, 
the Court has clearly articulated the link between jurisdiction and the presence of an 
individual right.148 Otis had seized a Dutch court with a private law claim for damages 
suffered from anti-competitive practices by the defendant. The Court first found that 
the prohibition of concerted practices by the Treaty conferred the right on others to 
claim damages suffered.149 It then stated that this right was guaranteed judicial protec-
tion. The national court therefore had in principle complete jurisdiction to review in 
law and fact, and that included acts of the national authorities and of the Commission.
Otis indicates that the national court must establish the presence of an individual 
right in EU law as a matter of law and on the facts of the case. Where the national 
court cannot do so, it has no guaranteed jurisdiction to decide the case or to make a 
reference to the Court of Justice pursuant to TFEU art. 257. In a series of subsequent 
chamber cases, the Court has spelled out that consequence. In Zakaria, for instance, 
the chamber pointed out that the so-called the Schengen Borders Code150 did con-
fer a right to dignity in border controls as a matter of EU law, but that the referring 
national court had not established that this right was implicated on the facts of the 
case. Therefore, the referring court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case and 
the ECJ did not have jurisdiction to give the requested preliminary ruling.151
This guaranteed jurisdiction of the Member States courts extends to disputes 
between private parties. It is true that the Charter generally does not obligate private 
parties.152 Yet, the Court has not hesitated to resort to the right of judicial protec-
tion in such disputes. Charter art. 47 of course then protects both private parties. 
146 Kadi II, ¶ 66.
147 ZZ, 50¶.
148 Otis, ¶¶ 42–45.
149 TFEU, art. 101.
150 Art. 6(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 2016 OJ L 77/1.
151 Zakaria, ¶¶ 39, 40; Marcos, 27 March 2014.
152 Leczykiewicz (2013).
Judicial Protection as the Meta-norm in the EU Judicial…
123
Accordingly, in Lindner, the ECJ Grand Chamber activated Charter art. 47 for both 
private parties. The case related to the civil action brought by a mortgage loan bank 
against Lindner whose current address was unknown.153 The national court had 
referred the question whether it had the jurisdiction to proceed in absentia of Lind-
ner as permitted by national procedure. The Court answered that the fundamental 
right of the applicant to effective civil action had to be balanced with the fundamen-
tal right of defense that also applied to civil procedure.154 The Court concluded that 
the in absentia-procedure was permitted, provided that the national court had taken 
all reasonable measures to locate the defendant.
The Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings pursuant to TFEU art. 267 
on questions of EU law referred to it by Member States courts. This creates a link 
with the jurisdiction of the national court to decide on the merits. The Court must 
have that jurisdiction when the referral concerns an individual right, and it must 
exercise it fully to the extent demanded by the individual right.
4.2  Rights and Objective Law
This link between judicial protection and the jurisdiction of member states courts over 
EU law has the logical consequence that full jurisdiction of a national court depends on 
the controlling rule creating an individual right. The presence of an individual right has 
become a threshold condition for the fundamental right to judicial protection and hence 
the guaranteed full jurisdiction of national courts. The guaranteed jurisdiction thus cov-
ers only a portion of the acquis. The jurisdiction of national courts over EU law which 
serves collective interests, and thus is merely objective, is not guaranteed.155 The Court 
of Justice has indeed drawn this conclusion, for primary and secondary EU law.
The flipside is that the jurisdiction of the Court for a preliminary ruling presup-
poses the jurisdiction of the referring national court over the merits, which depends 
the presence of an individual right.156 The Court has recognised this jurisdictional 
link. In ZZ, the ECJ Grand Chamber first satisfied itself that the reference from the 
national court related to the individual right of free movement before finding that 
it had jurisdiction to render the preliminary ruling requested.157 The flipside is that 
the ECJ has no jurisdiction for a preliminary ruling where the referring court itself 
does not have jurisdiction. In several chamber cases, the Court has indeed declined 
its jurisdiction to answer a referred question because there was no individual right 
of EU law demonstrably at issue in the national proceedings. The Zakaria judgment 
discussed above demonstrates this pars pro toto.158
153 Under Regulation of the Council No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I), 2001 O.J. L 12/1.
154 Hypoteční banka a.s. v Udo Mike Lindner, Case C-327/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-11,543, ¶¶ 49–52.
155 cf Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in DEB, [2010] E.C.R. I-13,852, ¶ 103.
156 Infringement proceedings are a means of objective legality control, and do not presuppose individual 
right, Danske Slagterier, [2009] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶¶ 38–39.
157 ZZ, ¶ 38.
158 Earlier Chartry, [2011] I-819, ¶ 25; Rîpanu, Case C-407/15, Order of Feb. 18, 2016, not published, 
EU:C:2016:167, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited; recently Owen Pardue, Case C-321/16, 10 Novem-
ber 2016.
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Much of EU primary law is objective. The Treaty provisions on the area of free-
dom, security and justice are such objective law159, as are those on economic and 
monetary union. In Pringle, the Full Court faced a reference querying the compat-
ibility with these provisions of the international treaty by which the Eurozone Mem-
ber States established the European Stability Mechanism. The Court answered that 
question in the affirmative, but it emphasized that it needed not provide a full review 
as the relevant Treaty provisions did not create individual rights.160
The Court has affirmed that much of the EU secondary legislation on environ-
mental matters protects collective interests and therefore is of purely objective-
law character.161 It has also drawn the consequences. In Enichem, the Court found 
that the obligation in art. 3(2) of the Waste Directive162 to inform the Commis-
sion in advance of draft rules only concerned the Member States while it did not 
confer any rights on individuals. Thus, the Member State court did not have EU-
jurisdiction.163However, the Court has gone to some length to identify rights for cer-
tain individuals under EU environmental legislation which then receive the protec-
tion of courts having jurisdiction. The case-law regarding the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive164 demonstrates the required interpretive operations. Thus, 
in the pre-Lisbon case Kraajieveld the Court declared that ‘concerned’ individuals 
had the ‘right’ to invoke in national court the ‘direct effect’ of the directive.165 The 
Court there seems to have in mind a procedural right for these individuals. Advocate 
General Elmer there had pointed out that so concerned was the plaintiff in the main 
proceedings, whose livelihood was allegedly in danger as a consequence of his not 
being heard in violation of the EIA Directive.166 He also affirmed that the directive, 
by obligating the authorities to hear the public, created a corresponding right.167 In 
Leth, post-Lisbon, the Court has stated that under that directive there was a right 
of concerned individuals to have the environmental impact of a project assessed.168 
Concerned natural or legal persons are also entitled to take action where there is 
159 Anton Vinkov v Nachalnik Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost, Case C-27/11, 7 June 2012, ¶¶ 41, 
42; Cholakova, Case C-14/13, 6 June 2013, ¶ 24 (relating to TFEU art. 67).
160 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Case C 370/12, 27 
November 2012), ¶ 34.
161 Trianel, ¶¶ 46, 51.
162 Directive 75/442 of the Council on waste, 975 O. J. L 194/39.
163 Enichem Base v. Comune di Cinisello Balsamo, Case 380/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2491, ¶ 23.
164 Directive 85/337 of the Council on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment, 1985 O.J. L 175/40.
165 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland
 Kraaijeveld, Case C-72/95, [1996] E.C.R. I-5431, ¶ 56; see also Commission v Germany (Grossk-
rotzenburg), Case C-4311/92, [1995] ECR I-2189; Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Region Wal-
lonne, Case C-129/96, [1997] ECR I-7411. On this issue Edward (2002) 3.
166 Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in Kraaijeveld, [1996] E.C.R. I-5406, ¶ 11 (Directive 85/337 
art. 6(2)).
167 Id. ¶¶ 69, 70.
168 Jutta Leth v Republik Österreich, Land Niederösterreich, Case C-420/11, 14 March 2013, ¶¶ 32, 36. 
But possibly not a right to damages for a breach of that obligation, ¶ 47.
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a risk that pollution levels set by environmental directives and designed to protect 
human health may be exceeded.169
Given the objective-law character of much environmental law, the EU has leg-
islated to ensure its judicial enforceability, in particular the Directive on Public 
Participation and Access to Justice170 that has amended a range of environmental 
directive. The jurisprudence of the Court relating to this legislation has brought it 
decisively under the judicial protection norm. Its approach has been that that this 
legislation creates dedicated procedural rights enjoying judicial protection and 
over which the national courts will therefore have jurisdiction. Thus, in Trianel, the 
Court dealt with the new art. 10a ¶ 3 of the amended EIA Directive.171 The Court 
acknowledged that the objective of the amendment was to strengthen the judicial 
enforceability of this objective EU environmental law through representative action 
of environmental organisations. But the Court then derived from the directive a pro-
cedural right of environmental organisations.172
The ECJ Grand Chamber has developed this rationale of procedural rights in 
subsequent cases, referring Charter art. 47. In Edwards, the Court stated that the 
new paragraph 10a ¶ 4 of Directive 85/337 limiting litigation costs served to pro-
tect individual rights within the meaning of Charter art. 47.173 In Lesoochranárske 
zoskupenie VLK (Brown Bears II)174, again referring to fundamental right of judi-
cial protection under Charter art. 47, the Court found that the new art. 6 ¶ 3 of the 
amended Habitat Directive gives environmental organisations the right to challenge 
in court the assessment made by the authorities without public participation. The 
contrary national procedure must remain disapplied. The procedural autonomy o the 
Member States becomes limited by their responsibility to ensure judicial protection 
for these EU law rights.175 In these cases, the Court then backs up this judicial pro-
tection-based interpretative approach with two additional arguments. The effective-
ness of EU environmental law requires that natural and legal persons can rely on it 
in court,176 and TEU art. 19(1) second subparagraph requires national procedure to 
provide effective remedies.
169 Janecek v Freistaat Bayern, Case C-237/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6221, ¶¶ 38 and 39.
170 Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for 
public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environ-
ment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/
EEC and 96/61/EC, 2003 OJ L 156/17–25.
171 Directive 2003/35 of the European Parliaments and the Council providing for public participation 
in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending 
with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337 and 96/61, 2003 O.J. 
L 156/17.
172 Trianel, ¶¶ 47, 48.
173 Edwards, Case C-260/11, 11 April 2013, ¶ 33.
174 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Obvodný úrad Trenčín, Case C-243/15, 8 November 2016.
175 Id. ¶ 65: “ensuring compliance with the right to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing enshrined 
in Article 47 of the Charter”.
176 Trianel, ¶¶ 43, 48: The effectiveness of art. 10a ¶ 3 of Directive 85/337 required that actions brought 
by environmental organisations be admissible to challenge national acts without further standing condi-
tions.
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Nevertheless, in the recent Białowieża Forest case177 the Court has demonstrated 
that the objective infringement procedure, TFEU art. 258, can be an effective means 
to enforce the range of objective EU environmental directives in the context of a 
large-scale government policy, there logging in a protected Natura 2000 site, and to 
deploy financial sanctions outside of the TFEU art. 260, constituting an important 
addition to the remedies.178
4.3  Harmonising the Procedure of Member States Courts
Where the national court has jurisdiction, there judicial protection drives for central-
uniform procedure, over the decentral-plural procedures that would correspond to 
the norm of member states’ procedural autonomy. The right of judicial protection 
codified in Charter art. 47 defines three requirements of such central-uniform proce-
dure: effective remedies (¶ 1), right to a court and to a fair process (¶ 2), and legal 
aid (¶ 3).
4.4  Remedies
Charter art. 47(1) requires an effective remedy. The remedy must ensure that the 
right in question is realised. Such remedies must exist in public, criminal and civil 
procedure. It is a consequence of the expansive fundamental right of judicial pro-
tection to require the most effective form of action, but the national procedure may 
choose an alternative if it achieves the level of protection that this standard proce-
dure requires. Pre-Lisbon, the European Court of Justice had already established, 
directly in EU law, the public law remedies of state liability179, refund of unlawful 
charges180, and interim relief.181 It had based these remedies on various grounds, the 
system of the Treaties, effectiveness, and judicial protection.182
Charter art. 47(1) now has become the sole ground for all these remedies, and the 
Court continues to develop its doctrine on the conditions of each of these remedies. 
It has furthermore established a requirement of judicial review of all administra-
tive acts. In Samba Diouf, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ states that requirement. It 
there only accepts that Luxembourg law removes from review the intermediary deci-
sion for an accelerated asylum on the condition that the review of the final decision 
encompasses that intermediary decision.183 The Court also requires that legislative 
177 Commission v Poland (Białowieża Forest), Case C-441/17, 17 April 2018.
178 Gormley (2017) at 66.
179 Francovich; a framework for the analysis of the subsequent case law is Tridimas (2001).
180 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio, Case 199/82, [1983] ECR 3595, ¶12.
181 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, Case C-213/89, 
[1990] ECR I–2433.
182 See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Factortame, [1990] ECR I-2450, ¶ 23; further Lenearts 
(2003).
183 Samba Diouf, [2011] E.C.R. I-7151, ¶ 56.
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acts be reviewable. Such legislative review can be entrusted to a specialised consti-
tutional court or, alternatively, to all courts. In Unibet184, handed down during the 
transition to the Charter, the Grand Chamber found that the right to judicial protec-
tion does not require a direct application for legislative review, provided the legisla-
tion can be reviewed incidentally in administrative review proceedings and that the 
applicant does not have to incur administrative or criminal penalties.185 The Court 
acknowledged that a direct application would be the most effective form of judi-
cial protection, but found the incidental review open under Swedish law was pro-
portionate considering the national procedure as a whole.186 It did, however, attach 
the caveat that the right of judicial protection may demand a specific remedy if oth-
erwise no protection can be obtained.187 In a complementary manner, the Court in 
Melki and Abdeli states that the centralised constitutional review, obtained through a 
mechanism of priority question on constitutionality, is compatible with Charter art. 
47, provided that the power of each national court remains unfettered to disapply 
national legislation found by the ECJ incompatible with EU law and to grant interim 
relief for the protection of rights in the meantime.188
Charter art. 47(1) requires a remedy also against private parties.189 L’Oreal con-
firms this. The ECJ Grand Chamber there stated that the right to a remedy requires 
that the national court may take the requisite measures including injunctive relief, in 
the absence of national transposing legislation.190 There also is a remedy of private 
damages.191
Right and remedy become distinct concepts throughout this jurisprudence, and 
direct effect assumes the role of one among several remedies.192 Hence, there may 
be a right, but there is no remedy of specific performance in EU law as the constant 
jurisprudence of the Court rules out horizontal direct effect of non-transposed direc-
tives. This limit on the remedy is justified by the consideration that directives do 
not impose substantive law obligations on individuals and thus ultimately by legal 
certainty.193
184 Unibet, Case C-432/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-2271.
185 Unibet, ¶ 64.
186 Id., ¶¶ 41, 42. See also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in the case, [2007] E.C.R. I-2275, ¶ 
56.
187 Id. ¶¶ 56–65.
188 Melki and Abdeli, Joined Cases Case C-188/10 and Case C-189/10, [2010] I-5667, ¶¶ 63–75. The 
Court reiterated the Melki and Abdeli criteria in A v. B, Case C-112/13, 11 September 2014 and Case 
C-5/14, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems, 4 June 2015.
189 Lenaerts (2011).
190 L’Oreal, [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 141 and 142.
191 Otis, 6 November 2012, ¶ 43.
192 Dougan (2007) at 934.
193 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-555/07, [2010] I-365, ¶ 46.
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4.5  Access to Court
Charter art. 47(2) first sentence requires access to a court, albeit not to several levels 
of jurisdiction.194 That court must satisfy the standards of independence and subjec-
tive and objective impartiality.195 Doctrine furthermore states that the court must 
be fully competent for review in law and fact196, and have the power to disapply 
offending national law, including constitutional law.197 Such access can be limited 
in national procedure for recognised objectives, provided the means chosen are 
proportionate.198
The proportionality of standing, time-limits and res iudicata and other conditions 
provided in national procedure becomes subject to fine-grained analysis. Thus, in 
Samba Diouf, the General Chamber considered the time-limit for challenging the 
administrative decision in asylum cases under Luxemburg law to be proportionate 
for legal certainty.199 In Alassini, the Court found the requirement in Italian law to 
attempt of an out-of-court settlement in disputes between providers and end-users 
un-der the Universal Service Directive200 not disproportionate since it left subse-
quent access to court unfettered.201 National law may provide for res judicata.202 But 
in Club Hotel Loutraki AE, the Court found the standing requirement in Cyprus law 
that members of a bidding consortium could only collectively challenge a procure-
ment decision to be a disproportionate restriction.203
4.6  Fair Process
Under Charter art. 47(2), the process before the national court must be fair. Fairness 
becomes the standard for all procedural institutions, including party disposition, 
burden of prove, and evidence. Again, it is the individual right that determines fair-
ness of the procedure.204 Oceana Group Editorial is illustrative. There, the Grand 
Chamber pointed out that the purpose of the EU consumer protection directives was 
to level the playing field between the consumer and economically powerful market 
194 Samba Diouf, [2011] E.C.R. I-7151, ¶ 69.
195 Altner v Commission, Case C-411/11 P, 15 December 2011, ¶ 15.
196 Melki, [2010] E.C.R., I-5667, ¶¶ 63–75.
197 Id. ¶ 63.
198 Internationale Fruchtimport Gesellschaft Weichert GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, Case C-73/10 P, 
16 November 2013, ¶ 53.
199 Samba Diouf, [2011] E.C.R. I-7151, ¶¶ 66–70.
200 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal 
Service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service 
Directive), 2002 O.J. L 108/51.
201 Alassini, [2010] E.C.R. I-2213, ¶ 65.
202 Ufficio IVA di Piacenza v Belvedere Costruzioni Srl, Case C-500/10, 29 March 2012.
203 Club Hotel Loutraki AE, [2010] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶¶ 78, 80. Earlier in Safalero Sri v Prefetto di Gen-
ova, Case C-13/01, [2003] I-8679, ¶ 54, the Court had accepted a standing requirement that limited the 
protection of the movement of goods to an action against the member state, but did not allow interven-
tion in proceedings against a third party.
204 ZZ, ¶¶ 48–69.
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participants. That purpose demanded that national courts have the power to raise 
proprio motu unfair terms in consumer contracts.205 While the disposition principle 
in national civil procedure that binds the court to the pleadings of the parties may 
ensure a fair hearing in general, that is not the case when these specific rights are at 
stake.
Charter arts. 47(2) and 48 specify the fair process through several sub-require-
ments, in particular right of defense, equality of arms, and the right to be heard. ECJ 
doctrine establishes that these apply to all procedures. In ZZ, the Grand Chamber 
confirmed that the right of defense guarantees an adversarial procedure in admin-
istrative law as well and thus the right of the defendant to know the grounds of an 
adverse decision.206 M. G. clarifies that a serious violation of the right to be heard 
can have the consequence that a detaining measure must be quashed.207 In Lind-
ner, the Court stated that the right of defense also applies to civil procedure, provid-
ing standards for the proceedings in absentia permitted in Hungarian civil proce-
dure. In Otis, the Grand Chamber stated that equality of arms is a standard for civil 
procedure.208
The Charter further structures the criminal trial through its arts. 49 and 50. These 
are the presumption of innocence and the right of defense209, legality and propor-
tionality of criminal offences and penalties210, and ne bis indem.211 These apply to 
criminal proceedings under national law.212 The Court has extended them to admin-
istrative procedures for the sanctioning of individuals, particularly Union citizen 
having exercised their free movement rights.213 This reflects the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights which attaches the safeguards of art. 6 ECHR to 
all detention cases.
Certain substantive fundamental rights of the Charter yield subject-specific pro-
cedural requirements. Thus, in Aguirre Zarraga, the Court found that the right of the 
child, Charter art. 24, required that the child be heard by the court.214 Union citizen-
ship also engenders them, such as the right to a use one’s own language in court 
proceedings of the host state.215
205 Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-10875, ¶ 35.
206 ZZ, ¶ 55.
207 MG and N. R., Case C-383/13 PPU, 10 September 2013.
208 Otis, ¶ 71.
209 Charter art. 48.
210 Charter art. 49.
211 Charter art. 50.
212 Proceedings concerning the enforcement of a financial penalty issued against Marián Baláž, Case 
C-60/12, 14 November 2013.
213 ZZ determines this for the free movement right of citizens in entry control cases.
214  Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz, Case C-491/10 PPU, [2010] E.C.R. I-14,247, ¶ 61.
215 Ulrike Elfriede Grauel Rüffer v. Katerina Pokorná, Case C-322/13, 27 March 2014.
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4.7  Legal Aid
Charter art. 47(3) requires that legal aid be made available by national procedure 
where that is necessary for effective court access. On legal aid, there is the argu-
ably the greatest variety and the least consensus between the member states. Yet, 
the chamber in the DEB case establishes central-uniform doctrine on legal aid for all 
individual rights under EU law.216 The Court concluded that art. 47(3) also protects 
legal persons such as DEB, and that legal aid therefore had to be provided to them 
for enforcing their rights under EU law. The Court balanced the rationale of art. 
47(3) with the countervailing considerations underlying the national rule that was 
more restrictive for legal persons, finding it disproportionate.217 The Court relied 
on Charter art. 47(3) to establish an EU-autonomous protection level higher than 
ECHR art. 6(3)(c) ECHR that only requires legal aid in criminal cases.
5  Judicial Protection as Constitutional Core
Judicial protection becomes the meta-norm for the EU judicial architecture, reorien-
tating it towards protecting individual rights guaranteed in EU law, against contesta-
tion either from the European Union or the Member States, with the far-reaching 
consequences documented earlier in this article. In this transformational process, 
judicial protection working as hard or formal meta-norm, prevailing over competing 
principles that would shape the EU judicial architecture. It overcomes the absolute 
authority of (objective) EU law against contestation. It prevails over competing prin-
ciples, such as non-justiciable political discretion of the EU institutions, the proce-
dural autonomy of the Member States, and the even the mutual trust in the Mem-
ber States’ judicial systems. This capacity of Judicial protection is maintained even 
when the conflicting principle is enshrined in primary law. Judicial protection hence 
becomes a constitutional core in EU primary law in the sense that Treaty-amend-
ment by the Contracting Parties cannot limit its reach. The finding begs the question 
whether this status is justified. The answer turns on legal and normative grounds.
In legal terms, the Charter and the TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty privi-
lege judicial protection. They formalise judicial protection at the apex of the norma-
tive hierarchy of the EU legal order. The Charter enshrines judicial protection as a 
fundamental right and the TEU makes providing it an obligation on Member States 
and indeed a condition of the very membership in the European Union. Although a 
decade has passed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it remains the rel-
evant expression of the highest authority, the Treaty-giver, comprising the Constitu-
tional Convention, the Intergovernmental Conference and the ratifying parliaments 
of all Member States.218 This positive decision of the Treaty-giver, through the Lis-
bon Treaty amendments, contrasts sharply with their decision not to formalise any 
216 DEB, ¶¶ 45–52.
217 DEB, ¶ 61.
218 A full discussion of the position of the Treaty-giver in EU law is beyond the scope of this article.
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of the other possible design precepts of the judicial architecture. In particular, the 
standards of minimum effectiveness and equivalence and also the procedural auton-
omy of the Member States remain unwritten general principle of EU law, located 
at a lower rung of the normative hierarchy. The Court’s jurisdiction extends to the 
Charter and the Treaty manifestations of judicial protection. That authorises the 
Court to progressively develop and strengthen judicial protection, hedged by the 
Charter’s prescriptive methodology that also applies to the fundamental right to 
judicial protection.
More interesting is the question of whether judicial protection should become 
such a hard, constitutional meta-norm. The affirmative normative argument connects 
judicial protection with a Dworkinian framework. Professor Dworkin has shown that 
rights supplement the positivist account of law.219 In this account, rights even if for-
malised as legal rights remain values and therefore retain a normative quality. There 
is a source right of all legal rights and proximity to it informs the normative quality 
of other rights.220 This normative quality of rights entails that they ought to be taken 
seriously, avoiding the costs of any erroneous limitations. Thus, rights are to be 
interpreted expansively when contested for collective goals in concrete instances.221 
Taking rights seriously in this way depends on courts and judges, capable of finding 
the one correct answer even in hard cases.
Judicial protection formalised as a fundamental right retains this normative 
quality. As such, it is to be taken seriously. Judicial protection therefore ought to 
be interpreted expansively vis-à-vis any contestation in the shape of restrictive pro-
cedural principles and rules. Moreover, judicial protection determines selectively 
which EU law becomes reality on the ground, and, as this article has shown, that 
means the rights of individuals. The normativity of judicial protection then lies in 
securing access to a court in order to take other rights seriously, which are created 
in primary, secondary and tertiary EU law. The perimeter of these rights enables 
individuals to lead a life in self-determination. Individual self-determination is a 
key expression of human dignity, which is the source right guaranteed at the top of 
the Charter (art. 1), and a value in which the EU legal order is grounded (TEU art. 
2). Taking self-determination seriously means that errors in the application of the 
included rights ought to be minimised, whether contested by Union authorities, by 
Member State authorities, or by private parties. Judicial protection is the vehicle for 
discharging this demand when it matters, because the individual will find herself 
typically in the minority constellation of being the national of another Member State 
confronts authorities representing the collective interest. It then matters that rights 
have one right answer.222 Judicial protection enables the EU judicial architecture to 
give this answer. It reaches it through the rationalising methodology that the Charter 
prescribes.
219 Dworkin (1997).
220 Ibid, at 272–8.
221 Ibid, at 184–222.
222 Ibid, at 81–131.
 V. Roeben 
123
This justification, of course, rests on the premise that the European Union is 
indeed an actor for justice as reflected in its legal order. But, if the EU is an actor 
of injustice, simple judicial protection would be of little use, without addressing 
deficiencies in that legal order.223 Here is not the place to even attempt to reach a 
definitive conclusion on whether the EU might be an actor for injustice rather than 
justice224, but merely to confirm the indissociable connection between content and 
enforcement of its law.
Departing from this Dworkinian reading, Lindeboom has recently argued that the 
Court was committing itself instead to legal positivism, constructing an EU legal order 
that conforms to Raz’s theory of the necessary conditions for a legal system: compre-
hensiveness, openness and a claim of supremacy.225 By taking judicial protection and 
thus the rights-content of EU law seriously, the Court is reasserting itself as a Dwor-
kinian court. Where the foundations of EU law as a new legal order are concerned, 
there the jurisprudence of the Court is best explained as developing a ‘community of 
principle’.226 This European community is distinct each of the Member States.
6  Conclusions
The article has argued that judicial protection serves as the meta-norm for governing 
the EU judicial architecture resting on the two pillars of the EU judicature and the 
Member States judicatures. Judicial protection prioritises individual rights created 
in EU law. These rights are to be protected if contested in name of collective inter-
ests either of the European Union or a Member State and in the same manner before 
all courts of the EU or of the Member States. Judicial protection-as-norm directs 
an expansion of the EU judicial architecture along three dimensions, horizontally 
towards full review by the Court of all acts of the political institutions, vertically 
towards central-uniform jurisdiction and procedure for national courts, and towards 
coordination between both pillars. Judicial protection welds the organisationally 
separate EU and Member States judicatures into one coherent judicial function, on 
which the rule of law in the EU comes to rest.
This meta-norm of judicial protection becomes progressively institutionalised, 
through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Treaty on the European Union, and 
the related doctrine of the Court of Justice. Charter art. 47 formalises a fundamen-
tal right of judicial protection at the core of judicial protection then is the individual 
right. It defines the federal question in EU law. This is a thick, evaluative concept. 
The Court is responsible for concretising this fundamental right into requirements, 
by balancing the principle of effective rights protection with any countervailing 
general objectives of an orderly procedure. These requirements become standards 
for the procedural legislatures of the European Union and the Member States.
223 Williams (2010) and Kochenov et al. (2015).
224 O’Brien (2017) (reasons why the EU could be an actor of injustice).
225 Lindeboom (2018).
226 Bengoetxea (1993) vi.
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Judicial protection drives the development of the EU judicial architecture. It pro-
duces the contours of a single code of procedure spanning the judicatures of the Euro-
pean Union and of the Member States. This code comprises doctrines of jurisdiction, 
a common procedure, and coordination mechanisms between the EU and Member 
States courts. The fundamental right to judicial protection guarantees national courts 
full jurisdiction to decide on the condition of the presence an individual right. The 
interpretive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice complements this rights-orientated 
jurisdiction to decide. Once jurisdiction is established, courts have the necessary pow-
ers to give effect to that right whether contested by public authorities or by private par-
ties. They exercise their jurisdiction through a harmonised procedure, and in a coordi-
nated fashion with the EU courts, the courts of other member states, and increasingly 
also with the courts of non-member states and international courts. This single code 
absorbs other doctrines, such as minimum effectiveness and equivalence for Member 
State procedure, and the complete system of remedies before the EU courts.
It would be naïve to ignore that the EU judicial architecture is faced with 
unprecedented structural challenges at Member States level. The article’s findings 
imply that these challenges are being addressed, also, through the meta-norm of 
judicial protection. The requirements of judicial protection are enforced by the 
European Union under art. 7 of the TEU. These minimum conditions of EU mem-
bership and the comprehensive obligation under art. 19 TEU for each Member 
States to provide for judicial protection through their judicatures absorb and rein-
force the requirements of judicial protection articulated by the Court in the inter-
pretation of the fundamental right that everyone holds to receive the protection of 
the courts in the defense of their EU law rights.
Institutional judicial protection furthermore becomes a hard or formal meta-
norm within the primary law, not at the disposition of the High Contracting Parties. 
Hence, the Treaties must not include rules incompatible with an effective protection 
of individual rights, and even less secondary law. Judicial protection overrides all 
conflicting principles, aiming at preserving non-justiciable decision-making of the 
EU’s political institutions, the procedural autonomy of the Member States, or their 
mutual trust. This elevated, constitutional status of judicial protection is justified, 
as a matter of positive law and normatively. Judicial protection makes human dig-
nity—in the sense of individual self-determination within the perimeter of EU law 
rights—actual rather than aspirational. This includes all rights-holders, EU citizens 
and third-country nationals, in the process of European integration. Their rights are 
taken rights seriously in a Dworkinian sense: when a right is contested in the name 
of collective interests, or other private interests, judicial protection minimises the 
error costs. Judicial protection, then, instantiates a novel category of hard, or con-
stitutional meta-norms, with transformative potential for the EU legal order.
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